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I became aware of George Packer’s writing during the run-up to the Iraq War. In and around 2002, the war-bent Bush Whitehouse and its cabinet/cabal of neoconservatives were pushing full throttle towards an invasion of Iraq. But behind them, mostly hidden in their wake, thousands of more reflective, liberal viewpoints were being quietly pulled along. Not all of them were, as you might expect, reflexively anti-war; they saw that there were indeed tangible and concrete benefits to ousting Saddam’s Baathist regime and opening up the possibility for a liberal democracy to take root in the center of the Middle East, without, at the same time, remaining undisturbed by and uncritical towards the potential costs and perils of an assault and occupation. Packer, a liberal reporter for The New Yorker, took the difficult, ambivalent position of being anti-war (he came of age after all in post-Vietnam America) but also too smart and sensitive (and for better or for worse, hopeful) to ignore the possibilities that a truly liberated Iraq could entail. Of all the ‘liberal hawks’ punditing around at the time (others that I remember reading included Jacob Weisberg of Slate, Thomas Friedman of The New York Times, Fareed Zakaria of Newsweek. There was also Christopher Hitchens of Slate — prior to that, Vanity Fair and The Nation –, but I found his stridency and rhetorical smugness enormously off-putting), Packer stood out for me for what I can only say was his writings’ sense of nuance. That admiration only deepened once the war had actually gotten underway, when he began writing war dispatches for the New Yorker from within Iraq itself, reporting on the occupation with a deeply intelligent and humane eye.
His book, The Assassin’s Gate: America in Iraq, which I finished last month, is in many ways his coverage of the war expanded into book form. It contains two thematic sections; the first covers the ramp up to the war, the second, the aftermath. Packer discusses at length the philosophical origins of Paul Wolfowitz’s neoconservatism (extrapolated — or corrupted – from Leo Strauss’ teachings at the University of Chicago), as well as the political jockeying of Iraqi exiles (including the thinker Kanan Makiya, and the now discredited Ahmed Chalabi) in the U.S., who for opportunistic or utopian reasons, agitated and lobbied for a military confrontation with Saddam. He also discusses the ideological lines that 9/11 and Iraq broke apart, and their reconstitution in new and uneasy patterns:
Ideas as big as [establishing a liberal democracy in Iraq] attracted strange bedfellows. The pairings both for and against grew so weirdly promiscuous that it was less useful to think in terms of left and right than of interventionists and anti-interventionists, or revolutionaries and realists. Old-fashioned realists from the Republican establishment found themselves on the same side of the debate as anti-imperialist leftists and far-right isolationists, while liberal veterans of humanitarian war became uneasy allies of administration hawks. Brent Scowcroft was tangled up with Gore Vidal and Pat Buchanan; Michael Ignatieff woke up next to Paul Wolfowitz. [The leftist intellectual Paul] Berman wondered whether he and the believers in the administration even wanted the same thing. “I’m not sure we’re speaking the same language because I don’t know how to judge the language of the neoconservatives,” he said one night in his apartment. “If the language is sincere, and there is an idealism among the neocons that echoes and reflects in some way the language of the liberal interventionalists of the nineties, well, that would be a good thing. It’s true that neoconservatism had a left-wing origin, and were it to turn out to the case — which I’m extremely skeptical about — that some of the neocons would return to their earliest intellectual roots, that would be excellent.” But if this warplane ever took off, “liberal interventionists of the nineties” would not be at the controls. So the administration’s intentions mattered greatly. “It’s extremely hard to judge what the people in the administration really do think,” Berman said. “On what points are they sincere? On what points are they hypocritical? They haven’t allowed us to be able to tell.
But after the war began, it wasn’t even anymore a question of the Bush administration’s original intentions, be they thoughtful, cynical, or insane. Moreover, Packer would argue, history’s judgment will fall on Bush’s arrogance, incuriosity, and incompetent handling of the occupation on Iraqi soil and in Iraqi hearts and minds, directly and unmediated. The second portion of the book, the remaining 350 pages, is comprised of Packer’s boots-on-the-ground reporting, the dirty, messy counterpart to the heady theorizations that conjured the war into actual being. He reports on the realities of the American boots on increasingly hostile ground, speaking to Americans and Iraqis alike (including a young State Dept administrator — a former scholar — named Drew Erdmann; a vibrant, secular young Iraqi woman named Aseel, who took to the new mandate of wearing veils unkindly; and a tough, sincere Captain named John Prior who seemed to be keeping street order through force of will along; many of these character had appeared in his New Yorker articles), and tracing many of the hardships and setbacks to policy decisions that were misinformed at best, and criminally negligent at worst. As Packer says in the book, and which he’s said since (in interviews on the Daily Show and the Colbert Report, for instance); history will judge Bush and the neocons very harshly for their fatal blunderings in Iraq.
Packer, however, doesn’t give the other side a free pass, either. And that’s because to him there are still elements of good faith alive — but slipping away — in Iraq whose human dimensions get lost underneath the bigger stories of ideological clashes and policy breakdowns.
With their eyes turned to such lofty matters [i.e. 'the war against WMDs, solving the Arab-Israeli conflict, more recently the war against terrorism and a model of democracy], few prowar ideologues allowed the bad news from Iraq to break their stride. Either they refused to credit it, blaming the media and the defeatists for hiding the truth, or they continued to take such a long view of history that a hundred Iraqis or a dozen Americans blown up in a suicide bombing hardly factored. But this was just as true on the antiwar side of the ledger. Experience taught me that the individual stories of Iraqis struggling against danger and the odds to create a better life for themselves and their country were impatiently flicked aside as soon as I tried to tell them. The retort was swift and sure: “This war is illegal, it’s immoral. Nothing good can come of a lie.” In spite of the enormous stakes and the terrible alternatives, most antiwar pundits and politicians showed no interest in success. When Iraqis risked their lives to vote, Arianna Huffington dismissed the elections as a “Kodak moment.” It was Bush’s war, and if it failed, it would be Bush’s failure.
He goes further to ask, however noble the abstract principles, if we were ever up for the work it would take to do it right — if we could walk the walk this time:
America in the early twenty-first century seemed politically too partisan, divided, and small to manage something as vast and difficult as Iraq. Condoleeza Rice and other leading officials were fond of comparing Iraq with postwar Germany. But there was a great gulf between the tremendous thought and effort of the best minds that had gone into defeating fascism and rebuilding Germany and Japan, and the peevish, self-serving attention paid to Iraq. One produced the Amery’s four-hundred-page manual on the occupation of Germany; the other produced talking points.
It’s a moving, thoughtful book, and I certainly would not be surprised if it wins the Pulitzer for non-fiction this year. It’s a terrible thought, ultimately, that the sort of insights contained in the book won’t be able to repair the extensive damage that has already been done. We will have to be satisfied with the hope that Iraq will reach some measure of political stability by the next generation (that is, if it hasn’t fallen into an intractable, decades-long sectarian civil war), and that in as yet unwritten histories that the Bush gang will take its deserving place amongst the worst administrations in American history.
Another favorite, Fareed Zakaria, wrote a review of the book for the Times.
More recently, the Sunday Times Magazine published a piece — ‘After Neoconservatism’ –Â by Francis Fukuyama (distilled from a larger forthcoming book called America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Newconservative Legacy).